Loss of Consortium – No Cause of Action for Parents
Authored by: Justin R. Bengston
L. L. et al. V. Newell Brands, inc., et al., 351 Conn. 262 (2025). In a 4-1 decision, the Connecticut Supreme Court declined to recognize a common law cause of action for loss of filial consortium brought by the parents of an infant who was injured following a fire. The action was a products liability claim brought in U.S. District Court against the manufacturers of both a car seat and an electric range, alleging the car seat caught fire as a result of the faulty design/production of both products. The U.S. District Court certified to the Connecticut Supreme Court the question of whether or not Connecticut recognizes a cause of action for loss of filial consortium. The Connecticut Supreme Court declined to recognize such a cause of action; determining that parents do not have an individual cause of action arising out of incidents in which their minor children suffer severe but nonfatal injuries because of the conduct of a third party. The Court explained the distinction between a loss of filial consortium from a loss of parental/spousal consortium (which is recognized in Connecticut) in that parents do not rely on their child for financial support, household assistance, or emotional solace. Where a child or spouse’s loss of parental/spousal consortium is actionable based on his or her inherent reliance and dependence on the injured parent/spouse, such reliance does not exist when evaluating a parent’s claim for loss of filial consortium. The majority and concurring opinion leaves open the possibility for parents, in their individual capacity, to bring causes of action claiming emotional distress (contrasted with the loss of consortium that is the subject of the decision) such as bystander emotional distress or negligent infliction of emotional distress. Such claims involve a different factual analysis (bystander emotional distress requires the plaintiff to contemporaneously witness the incident; or arrive soon thereafter and before substantial change had occurred to the victim’s condition or location). Therefore, future cases may further shape the legal limitations of parents’ right to recovery when their child sustain severe bodily injuries.
jbengtson@morrisonmahoney.com
Workers Compensation – Retiree’s Entitlement to Total Incapacity Benefits
Authored by: Michaela G. Gonzalez
Stephen T. Cochran v. Department of Transportation, 340 Conn. 844 (2024). The Connecticut Supreme Court ruled that an employee injured on the job is entitled to total incapacity benefits even after a voluntary retirement. The claimant suffered an injury to his lumbar spine in 1994 while lifting a large tractor trailer tire. A Voluntary Agreement was issued by the employer in 1995, formally accepting compensability of the claim and the 29.5% permanent partial disability rating assigned to the claimant’s lumbar spine. The claimant continued to work for the employer until 2003, when he agreed to an early retirement benefits package and had no intention of returning to the workforce. Following his retirement, his back condition worsened leading him to have another surgery in 2013. In 2015, he sought total incapacity benefits retroactive to his retirement in 2003 which led to the current decision. In relevant part, C.G.S. § 31-307(a) provides, “If any injury for which compensation is provided under the provisions of this chapter results in total incapacity to work, the injured employee shall be paid at a weekly compensation rate…” The defendants argued that the phrase “results in” requires a causal nexus between a claimant’s original compensable injury and the claimant’s subsequent total incapacity to work, and that the voluntary retirement was an independent cause of total incapacity which suggests the voluntary departure disrupts the required causal nexus between the original workplace injury and the subsequent total incapacity to work. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the statute does not require a causal nexus between the injury and the claimant’s actual employment status; it requires only that the injury causes an incapacity to work. The causal nexus is not disrupted by intervening circumstances, so long as the total incapacity results from the original compensable injury. Further, there is no requirement under § 31-307(a) that the claimant demonstrate a willingness or even attempt to find a job in order to obtain temporary incapacity benefits. Taking into consideration the above, the Supreme Court held that under the plain and unambiguous language of § 31-307(a), a worker who has sustained a compensable workplace injury under the act is eligible to receive total incapacity benefits when the total incapacity occurs after voluntary retirement from the workforce. The statute imposes no constraints on a claimant’s ability to collect temporary total disability benefits due to age or retirement status.
mgonzalez@morrisonmahoney.com
Workers Compensation – ALJ’s Discretion to Award Temporary Incapacity Benefits After Maximum Medical Improvement
Authored by: Michaela G. Gonzalez
Beulah Gardner v. Department of Mental Health and Addition Services Et Al., 351 Conn. 488 (2025). The Connecticut Supreme Court decided that the plain an unambiguous language of C.G.S. § 31-308 (b) gives an administrative law judge the discretion to award a claimant, after she reaches maximum medical improvement, ongoing temporary incapacity benefits in lieu of permanent partial disability benefits up to the statutory maximum of 520 weeks. The claimant suffered a compensable injury to the left wrist in 2016 while restraining a patient. Her injury ultimately resulted in two surgeries to the left wrist. A Voluntary Agreement accepting compensability of the injury was approved on May 8, 2018. In October of 2019, the employer sent the claimant a separation letter explaining that in light of the permanent restrictions she was assigned, the plaintiff could resign from her job or seek a disability retirement. In March of 2020, the plaintiff’s treating physician opined she had reached a point of maximum medical improvement and assigned an 8% permanent partial disability rating to the left wrist. In October of 2019, light duty work restrictions of no lifting more than 20 pounds with the left hand and no restraining patients was assigned by the respondent’s expert. A Form 36 was approved to convert the plaintiff’s benefits from temporary partial to permanent partial indemnity benefits effective May 21, 2020 based upon the treater’s opinion she had reached maximum medical improvement. The respondents issued a Specific Voluntary Agreement establishing March 11, 2020 as the date of maximum medical improvement. Importantly, workers’ compensation benefits are classified into two categories: specific and special benefits. Special benefits, such as temporary partial incapacity benefits, continue only as long as there is an impairment of wage earning power. Section 31-308 (a) makes clear that if an injury results in some incapacity which results in the claimant being able to perform some employment, but not fully perform her customary work, the claimant is entitled to temporary partial benefits. Those weekly benefits are limited to the statutory limit of 520 weeks. On the other hand, specific benefits, such as permanency benefits, are awarded for a fixed period in relation to the degree of impairment of a body part. Under § 31-308(b), permanent partial disability benefits compensate the injured employee for the lifetime handicap that results from the permanent loss of a body part. Entitlement to those benefits vests once the claimant has reached maximum medical improvement. It is settled law that the claimant cannot receive concurrently specific and special benefits for the same incident. Thus, benefits must be approved to convert from special to specific benefits. In relevant part, § 31-308(b) provides, “If the injury consists of the loss of a substantial part of a member resulting in a permanent partial loss of the use of a member, or if the injury results in a permanent partial loss of function, the administrative law judge may, in the administrative law judge’s discretion, in lieu of other compensation, award to the injured employee the proportion of the sum provided…” As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the statute provides the administrative law judge with discretion to award permanent partial disability benefits under § 31-308(b) in lieu of other compensation. Thus, in turn, the administrative law judge has the discretion to award other benefits, such as total or partial incapacity benefits, after the claimant reached maximum medical improvement in lieu of permanent partial disability benefits. Under the language of § 31-295 (c), permanent partial disability benefits become payable, or vest, after the claimant has reached maximum medical improvement. According to the Supreme Court, this is not meant to be interpreted that incapacity benefits must immediately end and permanent partial disability benefits must immediately begin. The Supreme Court believed there may be in some instances a great disproportion between the amount of specific compensation (permanent partial disability) provided and the actual effect of the injury, from the standpoint of the claimant’s earning capacity or physical impairment. Thus, in the case of a partial loss of function, the administrative law judge is called on, when the stage of maximum medical improvement has been reached, to exercise sound judgement in deciding whether to award specific compensation on the basis fixed in the statute or to permit weekly compensation for incapacity to continue.
mgonzalez@morrisonmahoney.com
Bad Faith – Sufficiency of Pleadings
Authored by: Megan A. Kittler
Howard Zarabet et al. v. Connecticare et al., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford at Hartford, 2025 WL 762609. The plaintiffs, a father and daughter, brought a breach of contract action against a health insurance company from which the father purchased health insurance for his family and the company that provided administrative services for the health insurance company. The daughter sought inpatient care at an adolescent mental health facility for behavioral and mental health issues that she has been experiencing. The defendants denied the claim for the daughter’s medical expenses related to this treatment on the ground that residential mental health was not a covered benefit and as a result, the father incurred over $100,000 of medical expenses. The plaintiffs brought, among other claims, a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing asserting that the defendant failed to investigate and evaluate the plaintiffs’ claim for benefits, unreasonably denied the plaintiffs’ claim for benefits, unreasonably withheld and delayed payments of benefits owed to the plaintiffs, and unreasonably denied the plaintiffs’ request for continued treatment. The defendants moved to strike this count of the complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient allegations to demonstrate that the defendants engaged in bad faith or were motivated by a dishonest purpose in denying coverage. The court denied the motion to strike and held that the breach of the implied covenant of good faith dealing count alleged the bad faith element in a legally sufficient manner because the court adopted the less stringent pleading standard for this claim, which requires a plaintiff to only assert allegations from which a reasonable inference of sinister motive and purposeful conduct can be made. In this instance the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants engaged in a series of actions over an extended period of time, in the face of the plaintiffs’ communications regarding, inter alia, terms of the plan that contradicted the denial decision. Therefore, the Court reasoned that it could be reasonably inferred from the plaintiffs’ allegations that the defendants used improper and unfounded bases for denying the plaintiffs’ claim and sought to avoid review thereof, for the purpose of avoiding making a substantial payment.
mkittler@morrisonmahoney.com
