Premises Liability – Duty to Unknown Licensees
Authored by: Justin R. Bengtson
Cogdell v. Jibram, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford at Milford, 2024 WL 3338041. A trial court granted a landowner’s motion for summary judgment where the evidence illustrated that the injured plaintiff, who slipped and fell on snow and ice in a parking lot controlled and maintained by the defendants, was an “unknown licensee” considering that the defendants had no actual or constructive knowledge of the plaintiff’s presence on the property on the date and time of the incident. The plaintiff conceded that she had no intention of going to the defendant’s business, and was only on the defendant’s land on her way to visit another store. The Court agreed that because there was no evidence that the defendant had knowledge of the plaintiff’s presence on the premises, defendants did not owe plaintiff a duty to exercise reasonable care to make the condition reasonably safe or warn the plaintiff of the condition and risks involved therein. The Court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment, declining to extend any duty to the defendants under these circumstances despite acknowledging that the premises at issue, a parking lot, are readily accessible to the public; given the plaintiff’s failure to present any evidence that would create an issue of fact related to the defendants’ actual or constructive knowledge. In a footnote, the Court commented that the duty analysis might differ based on the entrant’s status as a licensee or invitee – therefore, considering that the plaintiff alleged she was an invitee in her complaint, the critical finding in this decision appears to be the plaintiff’s concession that she had no intention of going to the defendant’s business at the time of her fall.
Trade Secrets – Noncompete Enforceability
Authored by: Emiko W. Schaeffer
Dur-A-Flex, Inc. v. Dy, 349 Conn. 513 (2024). The plaintiff, Dur-A-Flex, had hired one of the defendants as a research chemist in 2004 to work on the development of a resin/hardener/aggregate. The chemist entered into a noncompete agreement in 2011 and agreed to not work with a competitor for two years after the termination of his employment and to keep trade secrets confidential. Dur-A-Flex then learned that the chemist had filed articles of incorporation prior to the effective date of his termination, had constructed a laboratory in his garage to develop flooring systems in 2012, had agreed to test products for one of Dur-A-Flex’s longtime customers at a lower rate, had acted as a consultant for varying flooring companies, and had started a new company with his nephew to develop new flooring products. Dur-A-Flex brought suit on the grounds that the chemist had breached the noncompete agreement and his common-law duty of confidentiality. Dur-A-Flex further brought claims against the varying entities with whom the chemist worked for misappropriation of Dur-A-Flex’s trade secrets in violation of the Connecticut Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“CUTSA”) and civil conspiracy. The trial court found that the noncompete agreement was unenforceable due to lack of adequate consideration. However, the Connecticut Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings on the grounds that a promise of indefinite, continued employment for an at-will employee in exchange for the employee’s promise not to compete constitutes adequate consideration to form an enforceable agreement. The Supreme Court further found that the claims against the subsequent entities whom the chemist was involved did not knowingly misappropriate Dur-A-Flex’s trade secrets, noting that Dur-A-Flex knew that its claims were specious at best. In order to be held in violation of CUTSA, the defendant must “actually or constructively possess the information that constitutes the trade secret, and not merely use or possess a product that embodies the trade secret but does not disclose to the defendant any material aspect of the trade secret itself.” With regard to the civil conspiracy claims, the Supreme Court found that the claims were preempted by CUTSA and that any conclusion otherwise would result in a confusing and nonuniform patchwork of statutory and nonstatutory causes of action arising from misappropriation of trade secrets, which is the exact scenario the preemption provision was designed to prevent. Finally, the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred in ordering disgorgement of all profits, amounting to over $1.8 million, reasoning that the remedies under CUTSA are appropriate only for the period of time that the information would have remained unavailable to the defendant in the absence of the appropriation.
