Statutes of Limitation – Savings Statute
Authored by: Justin R. Bengtson
Laiuppa v. Moritz, SC 20798 (2024). Connecticut General Statutes § 52-592 is often referred to as the “savings statute” and permits a plaintiff whose original lawsuit failed for certain reasons to refile within one year of the dismissal of the original lawsuit. In order for a litigant to avail herself to the accidental failure of suit statute, the original lawsuit must have been “commenced within the time limited by law.” The Laiuppa case arose out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred June 21, 2016. The plaintiff’s counsel attempted service of process by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to a state marshal on June 15, 2018. The plaintiff’s counsel provided the state marshal with an incorrect address for the defendant, and the state marshal left the summons and complaint as instructed on June 18, 2018. The plaintiff’s counsel also provided the defendant’s insurer with a copy of the summons and complaint. The defendant moved to dismiss the matter for lack of personal jurisdiction based on insufficient service of process, which was granted by the Court. The plaintiff then filed a second lawsuit pursuant to the accidental failure of suit statute. The defendant moved for summary judgment and argued that the original lawsuit was not timely commenced and was therefore barred by the statute of limitations. The Court granted the Defendant’s motion finding that the lawsuit was not commenced within the statute of limitations considering the defendant received a copy of the summons and complaint on July 17, 2018 – which was outside of the two year statute of limitations; and outside of the thirty days afforded by statute to a state marshal to make service if process is delivered to the marshal within the statute of limitations. The Connecticut Appellate Court affirmed the decision. Thereafter, the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed that the failed action was not timely commenced within the meaning of the savings statute. In a thorough discussion of the meaning of “commenced within the time limited by law” the Supreme Court clarified that the savings statute does not save any action in which a “good faith attempt at service of process has been made,” but rather saves actions where the defendant has “actual or effective notice of the action against him or her.” The Supreme Court emphasized that the relevant inquiry for purposes of evaluating whether a lawsuit was timely commenced for purposes of the savings statute is whether the defendant received the summons and complaint – not the means by which these documents were received. Notably, the defendant received notice of the lawsuit through correspondence sent to him by his insurer on July 13, 2018. Had the correspondence from the defendant’s insurer included a copy of the summons and complaint, the fact intensive inquiry related to whether the defendant had “actual or effective notice” necessary to commence the lawsuit “within the time limited by law” may have had a different outcome considering the tolling effect on a statute of limitations, and the Supreme Court’s emphasis on whether a defendant has actual or effective notice of the action within the time limited by law.
Vexatious Litigation – Bad Faith Pleading
Authored by: Megan H. DeFrank
Dorfman v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 227 Conn. App. 347 (2024): At issue in this appeal was whether the defendant’s pattern of conduct with respect to its pleading was sufficient to state a basis for a vexatious litigation claim. The underlying action involved a 2014 motor vehicle accident in which the plaintiff was injured after the defendant-tortfeasor failed to stop his car at a stop sign. The plaintiff sought underinsured motorist benefits pursuant to her policy with Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company and, separately, settled her claims against the tortfeasor. An investigation into the claim demonstrated that the tortfeasor was one-hundred percent liable for the accident. Liberty Mutual filed an answer in which it claimed to have insufficient information in response to several of the plaintiff’s allegations, denied that the tortfeasor failed to stop at the stop sign, and asserted special defenses of comparative negligence. The plaintiff filed the subject vexatious litigation action alleging that the defendant, Liberty Mutual, asserted special defenses without probable cause to do so. The defendant moved for summary judgment on the basis that it was subject to immunity under the litigation privilege and that it had probable cause for its pleadings, including the special defenses asserted. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, finding that its pleadings were filed with probable cause. The Appellate Court disagreed with the trial court’s finding and held that the defendant demonstrated a pattern of bad faith pleading in the underlying motor vehicle claim, which was a sufficient basis for a vexatious litigation claim.
Tort Law – Sociologist as Expert
Authored by: Emiko W. Schaeffer
Prescott v. Gilshteyn, 227 Conn. App. 553 (2024). This case involved the plaintiff’s allegations sounding in assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress and intimidation based upon bigotry or bias. The plaintiff, a black woman, had attended a protest at the Capitol building to demonstrate her support of the Black Lives Matter movement. The plaintiff asserted that the defendant, a white woman, spat directly into her face after they exchanged words about “black on black” crime. During the hearing on the plaintiff’s application for a prejudgment remedy, the plaintiff introduced expert testimony from a professor of criminology and social justice on issues related to racism and social justice. The defendant argued that the testimony should not have been admitted into evidence because as a nonscientific expert, he did not have any special skill or knowledge directly applicable to the matter in issue, which concerned the defendant’s intent at the time she spat on the plaintiff. On appeal, the Connecticut Appellate Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the professor’s testimony pursuant to the standard previously set forth by the Connecticut Supreme Court for the admission of nonscientific evidence. The Appellate Court found that the professor had expert knowledge that was directly applicable to the matter at issue, that his testimony offered the court a historical and sociological perspective on racism that would not have been within the knowledge of an average person, and that his testimony providing context for how the defendant’s statements could be construed was helpful to the court in its determination of whether the defendant exhibited racial bigotry or bias.
