CT Property and Casualty Insurance Law Newsletter- June 2026

In Toni et al v. Progressive Direct Ins. Co. et al, the plaintiffs were passengers in a rented motor vehicle operated by another person in Florida when that vehicle was rear ended by another vehicle.  The liability insurer for the tortfeasor denied coverage for the plaintiffs’ claims.  At the time of the accident, the operator of the rental vehicle was covered by a policy issued by Progressive Direct Insurance Company providing Uninsured Motorist (“UM”) coverage in the amount of $100,000 / $300,000 per person / accident.  In addition, another policy issued by Ohio Security Insurance Company to Success, Inc. provided UM coverage of $1,000,000 per accident.  One of the plaintiffs was the president of Success, Inc.  The trial court previously ruled that the plaintiffs were not entitled to UM coverage under either of the policies.  Pursuant to Connecticut’s UM regulations, UM coverage “shall insure the occupants of every motor vehicle to which the bodily injury liability coverage applies.”  Under the express terms of the Progressive policy, the bodily injury liability coverage provided by the policy extended to motor vehicles rented by the operator of the subject vehicle in this case.  The plaintiffs were occupants of a motor vehicle to which the bodily injury liability coverage of the Progressive policy applied such that, pursuant to the applicable regulations, Progressive was required by law to extend UM coverage to them in connection with the accident.  For these reasons, the Appellate Court reversed the trial court judgment relating to the Progressive policy.  Regarding the Ohio Security policy, the plaintiffs argued that the policy’s UM endorsement contained an ambiguous definition of “insured” because it used language oriented toward individuals when the named insured was a corporation.  Alternatively, acknowledging that the named insured was a corporation, the plaintiffs contended that the UM endorsement language was confusing and ambiguous and seemingly covered anyone with a bodily injury, including themselves.  The Appellate Court distinguished the facts of the present case from previous Supreme Court cases which had found ambiguities in the policy language and had also cautioned against the use of coverage terms applicable to individuals and/or family members in UM endorsements of commercial automobile insurance policies.  Here, the Appellate Court noted that the Ohio Security policy expressly provided two sets of definitions of an “insured,” delineated separately, with the applicable definition to be determined by the classification of the named insured being either an individual or a corporation.  Finding no ambiguity in the applicable policy language, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court judgment relating to the Ohio Security policy.

Superior Court – Extracontractual Claims – Motion To Strike

In Amadasun et al v. Pacific Specialty Ins Co., the plaintiffs filed suit against the defendant that denied a claim for homeowners insurance coverage following a water loss.  The defendant moved to strike the plaintiffs’ claims for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligence, violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (“CUTPA”) and unjust enrichment.  As for the claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the defendant argued that the factual allegations were insufficient to give rise to a reasonable inference of bad faith conduct and that the claim thus failed as a matter of law. The plaintiffs countered that they made sufficient allegations of delayed payments, ignoring of policyholder rights, and intentional leveraging of the policyholders’ hardship to gain financial advantage.  The Court, without drawing conclusions about the merits of the claim, decided that the allegations were legally sufficient and denied the motion to strike the claim.  As for the negligence claim, the Court noted that the complaint did not allege a duty separate and apart from the defendant’s contractual duties.  Although the complaint asserted specifically the defendant’s duty at issue was independent of any contractual duty, the Court found this conclusory characterization was belied by the factual allegations themselves, all of which pointed to the contractual relationship between the parties as the foundation of the plaintiffs’ negligence claim.  The Court granted the motion to strike the claim.  As for the CUTPA claim, the Court found that the plaintiffs included only bald assertions that the defendant had committed unfair insurance practices as a general business practice, which other courts have routinely rejected when addressing motions to strike.  Thus, the motion to strike the claim was granted.  As for the unjust enrichment claim, although the Court acknowledged that a plaintiff may plead unjust enrichment and breach of contract as alternative legal theories, here the plaintiffs breach of contract allegations were incorporated into the unjust enrichment claim, which according to the Court created an internal and legal inconsistency.  The motion to strike the claim was granted.

Appellate Court – Duty To Defend – Diminution In Value Damages

In Amica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Gilleran et al, the plaintiff insurer appealed from the partial summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendants in a declaratory action regarding the insurer’s duty to defend as to certain claims arising out a motor vehicle accident.  The plaintiff in the underlying motor vehicle tort action alleged that she had suffered, as a result of the insured’s negligence, “a diminution in value to her vehicle”, “a loss of the right to use her vehicle”, “lost time to pursue one’s interests,” “a loss of life’s enjoyment,” and “inconveniences.”  The plaintiff insurer retained defense counsel for its insured in the tort action while reserving its rights and asserting that there was no insurance coverage available for any alleged “diminution in value” and that the insurer thus no obligation to indemnify or reimburse the underlying tort plaintiff with respect to said claim.  While the tort action was pending, the plaintiff insurer filed a declaratory action.  Within that declaratory action, the defendants, which included the insureds and the plaintiff in the tort action, filed motions for summary judgment and argued that the foregoing claims within the underlying tort action potentially fell within the coverage provided by the insurer’s policy.  The plaintiff insurer filed its own motion for summary judgment arguing that no coverage existed for the claims.  The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants and concluded that the claim for damages related to the diminution in value of the tort plaintiff’s vehicle was potentially recoverable under the policy, which triggered the insurer’s duty to defend.  The subject insurance policy defined “property damage” as “physical injury to, destruction of or loss of use of tangible property.”  The policy did not define the term “destruction.”  The Appellate Court noted that Connecticut courts have long recognized that destruction can be total or partial in nature.  The Appellate Court further observed that a vehicle that requires repair following a collision necessarily is one that has been partially destroyed.   The Appellate Court therefore concluded that “destruction,” as that term was used in the definition of property damage set forth in the policy, encompassed both total and partial destruction of tangible property, which was thus covered under the policy.  When repairs fall short of putting a vehicle in substantially the same condition as before the collision, leaving the vehicle partially destroyed, diminution in value damages are warranted.  The Appellate Court rejected the plaintiff insurer’s contention that diminution in value to a motor vehicle cannot constitute destruction of tangible property, as that terminology is used in the policy.  The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s decision on the defendants’ motions for summary judgment.