Author by : Joesph R. Ciollo
U.S. District Court – Duty to Defend – Summary Judgment
In Stanley v. Vermont Mutual Ins. Co., the plaintiff, who was the defendant’s insured, filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking a declaration that the defendant had a duty to defend and indemnify her in connection with an underlying action in which Jane and John Doe (the “Does”) asserted claims for invasion of privacy, violation of C.G.S. § 19a-583, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Does were patients at Yale-New Haven Hospital (“Yale-New Haven”) and had received in vitro fertilization treatments. The Does alleged that Yale-New Haven maintained their confidential patient information electronically, so it could be retrieved and reviewed on its computer system; this included information about their fertility treatments. The Does alleged that the insured accessed and viewed their confidential patient information concerning their fertility treatments. They alleged that the insured did so using the electronic medical records system maintained by and the credentials provided to her by Yale-New Haven. They also alleged that when the insured accessed the Does’ information, she did so during work hours. In addition, the Does alleged that the insured did not have authorization from the Does to access, view, or retrieve such information and that the insured did not provide the Does with care or treatment. The aforementioned statute authorizes a private cause of action for injuries suffered as a result of a violation involving certain confidential HIV-related information. The insured plaintiff and defendant filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The defendant argued that the insured’s alleged acts did not constitute an “occurrence” because they were not an “accident.” The Court noted that while the alleged conduct was not an occurrence under the definition of that term in the Major Policy Provisions because it was not an accident, the policy’s Enhancement Amendment brought her conduct within the definition of an occurrence. The defendant argued that the policy’s penal exclusion barred coverage due to the alleged violation of C.G.S. § 19a-583. However, the Court found this exclusion to be inapplicable because the alleged violation was not criminal in nature. Finally, the defendant argued that coverage was barred by the exclusion for injury arising out of or in connection with a business engaged in by an insured. The Court noted that there was no genuine issue of with respect to the fact that the Does’ allegations in the underlying action showed that the insured used her employment status to effectuate the harmful act. Although the insured took additional steps after she was no longer at work that proximately caused the injury to the Does, without the access to the medical records the insured had by virtue of her employment with Yale-New Haven, she would not have been able to harm the Does as alleged in the underlying action. Accordingly, on the basis of the business exclusion, the Court found that the defendant did not have a duty to defend the insured in the underlying action, and consequently, no duty to indemnify her. Summary judgment was granted in favor of the defendant.
U.S. District Court – Good Faith and Fair Dealing – Motion to Dismiss
In Jimenez v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., the plaintiff was the owner of a two-family property that sustained damage following a fire. Part of the plaintiff’s claim for coverage included a claim for fair rental value, as the plaintiff claimed that the property had been rented pursuant to an oral lease. The defendant denied the plaintiff’s claim and cited the plaintiff’s failure to provide requested records and documents. The plaintiff filed suit and included claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and declaratory judgment. The defendant moved to dismiss the claims for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and declaratory judgment. Contrary to the defendant’s argument, the Court found that the claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing did not rest solely on the conclusory allegation that the defendant acted in bad faith. The Court noted specific allegations made by the plaintiff which identified specific claim handling decisions allegedly undertaken by the defendant in bad faith. Taken together, these allegations plausibly alleged more than a mere coverage dispute or negligent investigation. At the pleading stage, the plaintiff need only allege sufficient factual content to permit a reasonable inference that the defendant acted with the dishonest purpose required under Connecticut law, and he did so here. The motion to dismiss was denied as to the claim for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim. The defendant argued that the declaratory judgment claim should be dismissed because the plaintiff simply restated the breach of contract and bad faith counts. The Court agreed that the declaratory judgment claim did not add any independent issues that were not included in other counts. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss was granted as to the declaratory judgment claim.
Superior Court – Underinsured Motorist Coverage – Suit Limitation Period
In Rodin v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Co.,the plaintiff as injured in a motor vehicle accident on February 11, 2021and subsequently settled her claims against the identified tortfeasor for the amount of his liability insurance coverage limit. On February 2, 2025, the plaintiff filed suit against the defendant to recover Underinsured Motorist (“UIM”) benefits. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff’s suit was untimely pursuant to her insurance policy. The defendant argued that the plaintiff did not bring her suit within the policy’s three-year suit limitation period and did not provide written notice to the defendant of any claim that she may have had involving an underinsured motor vehicle within that three-year period, thereby failing to satisfy her policy’s criteria to toll the suit limitation period. The plaintiff argued that Executive Order No. 7G, issued by the governor of Connecticut on March 19, 2020, gave a deadline extension to the plaintiff to be able to either file her suit or to provide written notice of a UIM claim pursuant to her insurance policy, and that she successfully tolled her suit limitation period by providing written notice of her UIM claim. The Executive Order expired on March 1, 2021. The plaintiff argued that the Executive Order gave her an extra 346 days to either file her UIM suit or to provide written notice of an underinsured motorist claim. The Court noted that pursuant to a prior holding of the Connecticut Appellate Court, the Executive Order No. 7G was not meant to provide a credit of 346 days for a claimant who did not yet have a cause of action as of the effective date of Executive Order. Here, the three-year limitation to bring suit or provide written notice of a UIM claim would have started running on March 1, 2021, which therefore the plaintiff’s deadline would have been March 1, 2024. According to the evidence submitted by the defendant, the plaintiff did not file written notice of a UIM claim until October 30, 2024. The motion for summary judgment was granted
